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Giani, Helios Herrera, Selina Hofstetter, Rafa Hortala-Vallve, Navin Kartik, Pablo Montagnes, Erik Snowberg,
Richard Van Weelden, and many seminar and conference participants for their helpful comments. Pablo Montagnes
and Scott Tyson coined the term ‘Theoretical Implications of Empirical Models’ used in the conclusion of this paper.
All remaining errors are the author’s responsibility.
Are Biased Media Bad for Democracy?
Abstract
This paper assesses the normative and positive claims regarding the consequences of biased
media using a political agency framework that includes a strategic voter, polarized politicians,
and news providers. My model predicts that voters are always better informed with unbiased
than biased outlets even when the latter have opposite ideological preferences. However,
biased media may improve voter welfare. Contrary to several scholars’ fears, partisan news
providers are not always bad for democracy. My theoretical findings also have important
implications for empirical analyses of the electoral consequences of changes in the media
environment. The impact of left-wing and right-wing biased outlets depends on the partisan
identity of office-holders. Empirical findings may, thus, not be comparable across studies
or even within studies over time. Existing empirical studies are unlikely to measure the
consequences of biased media as researchers never observe and can rarely approximate the
adequate counterfactual: elections with unbiased news outlets.
Replication Materials: Not relevant for this article
Word count: approx 9,980 words
There is a broad consensus that news outlets are politically biased. Politicians commonly assert
it. The broader public in the U.S (Newseum Institute, 2017) and elsewhere (Reuters Institute,
2015) believes it. And multiple academic studies have confirmed it (Puglisi and Snyder, 2015a).
But are biased news providers harmful for democracy?
Some argue so (e.g., Entman, 1989; McChesney, 2004; Ladd, 2012). Broadly speaking, these
scholars argue that through omission or presentation bias, partisan outlets—newspapers, television
channels, or radio stations—reduce the information available to the electorate. As information is
key to holding politicians accountable, democracy faces “a political crisis of the highest magnitude”
(McChesney, 2004, 18). In a time of high political polarization when politicians are often misaligned
with the electorate, this problem appears especially acute. As Prior puts it (2013, 123), “The
median voter has never been so bored.”
This paper assesses the normative claims regarding the consequences of biased media. To do
so, I use a political agency framework in which a representative voter faces the dual problem of
controlling and selecting polarized politicians. I analyse equilibrium behaviors under four different
media environments. In the first one, the voter is informed by a news outlet who shares her policy
preference, an environment I refer to as ‘unbiased.’ In the second, the voter receives news reports
from two biased media outlets, ideologically located to the right and the left of the voter. Since the
voter is exposed to diverse viewpoints, I describe this environment as ‘balanced.’ The remaining
two cases correspond to ‘right-wing biased’ and ‘left-wing biased’ media environments in which
the voter’s information comes from a single right-wing or left-wing news provider, respectively.
I compare the equilibrium behaviors of all actors—outlet(s), the voter, and politicians—across
media environments. In line with the literature, I show that the voter is always less informed
with biased news providers (whether the environment is balanced or not) than with an unbiased
outlet. Keeping the office-holders’ actions constant, the voter’s welfare would be maximized in
an unbiased media environment. However, when electoral incentives are sufficiently strong, I
show that politicians’ behavior changes with the media environment. Taking into account these
equilibrium effects, I find that the voter is better off with two (or even one) biased news providers
than with an unbiased outlet. Therefore, the often expressed opinion that media bias is bad for
democracy needs to be qualified.
I study a two-period game. There is a single election at the end of the first period when the voter
decides whether to reelect the incumbent or to replace him with a randomly drawn challenger. Each
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period, the office-holder makes a policy choice. The impact of the implemented policy depends
on an underlying state of the world that is directly observed by the office-holder, but not by the
voter. The voter would like the policy chosen to always match the state; the incumbent’s ideal
policy is to the right of the voter, and the challenger’s to the left. Further, politicians can be either
extremist or moderate. Extremists are non-strategic. An incumbent, if extremist, always chooses
the most right-wing policy; a challenger, if extremist, always implements the most left-wing policy.
Moderates respond to electoral incentives. An incumbent, even if moderate, has policy preference
to the right of the voter’s; a challenger, even if moderate, to the left. Whether a politician is
moderate or extremist is his private information, or type.
In the second period, after the election, the office-holder no longer faces any electoral constraint.
Hence, he always chooses his preferred policy. Since an extremist’s policy preferences are further
away from the voter’s, the voter elects the politician she believes is more likely to be moderate.
Before making her electoral decision, the voter observes the incumbent’s policy choice, which
may reveal information about his type. She also receives a news report from one or two outlets
depending on the media environment. This report contains an editorial, or opinion piece, which
takes the form of falsifiable information about the incumbent’s type (moderate or extremist). This
report may also include a news story, which takes the form of verifiable information about the
state of the world. The model thus encompasses the possibility for presentation bias (outlets can
lie about type in their editorial) and omission bias (outlets can omit information by hiding news
stories).
Turning to the unbiased media environment, the news provider, like the voter, seeks to maximize
the likelihood that a moderate incumbent is reelected and an extreme incumbent replaced. The
outlet thus truthfully discloses all of its information. The voter is perfectly informed about the
incumbent’s type and effectively screens politicians. As a result, an unbiased news provider is
optimal for selection. However, this comes at a cost. The incumbent’s reelection prospects depend
on the media report, which reveals his type, not on his policy choice. A moderate incumbent then
implements his preferred policy, which differs from the voter’s. Hence, an unbiased news provider
induces a loss of control.
In contrast to an unbiased outlet, a right-wing news provider would prefer the incumbent to
be reelected; a left-wing outlet the incumbent to be replaced; neither shares the voter’s electoral
objective. This has dramatic consequences for editorials. I show that, even in a balanced media
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environment, editorials suffer from presentation biases and can never be trusted by the voter. The
voter, however, is not completely uninformed with biased news providers. The left-wing outlet
always publishes bad news for the incumbent (i.e., stories that hurt his electoral chances), while
the right-wing outlet shares good news (i.e., stories that improve his prospects).
Reduced information entails some loss in term of selection. Lacking information about the
incumbent’s type, the voter becomes more likely to incorrectly reelect an extremist or replace a
moderate. But a moderate politician now has some incentive to choose a first-period policy that
signals his type and improves his electoral prospects. To distinguish himself from an extremist,
a moderate incumbent implements a policy closer to the state of the world and, thus, to the
voter’s ideal point. As a result, with biased media outlets, the voter gains some control over the
incumbent.
The analysis reveals that an unbiased news provider is good for selection, but bad for control,
whereas the reverse holds true for biased outlets. Selecting moderates is not so valuable with
misaligned politicians. Absent electoral incentives, moderates generally do not choose the voter’s
preferred policy. In turn, controlling politicians implies that a moderate incumbent’s first-period
choice is aligned with the voter’s ideal policy. Hence, better control dominates worse selection,
and voter welfare is higher with biased outlets.
My results also have some implication for positive analysis of biased media. First, empirical
studies are unlikely to measure the electoral consequences of biased media. To recover this effect,
researchers need to compare electoral results in biased and unbiased media environments. But a
researcher’s baseline is almost always a balanced media environment. While an unbiased outlet
truthfully reports all information, editorials from biased news providers always suffer from presen-
tation bias. Because the electorate is more informed with unbiased media, a balanced environment
is a poor approximation for an unbiased one, even absent any change in office-holders’ behavior.
Further, as noted above, a partisan outlet hides bad news for office-holders who shares the
outlet’s ideology and hides good news for politicians whose politics do not match those of the
outlet. Hence, the electoral impact of a change in the media environment is a function of both
the partisan identity of the office-holder (right-wing or left-wing incumbent) and the direction
of the change (from balanced to a right- or a left-wing biased media environment). As a result,
researchers should be careful interpreting varying estimates over time, especially if the political
context is not constant (as in Martin and Yurukoglu, 2017). To facilitate comparability of findings
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across studies or over time within a study, this paper recommends that researchers provide detailed
descriptions of the media and political environments they study.
Before connecting my work with the formal literature, a word of caution is in order. This work
does not argue that biased media are unambiguously good or that empirical studies of media bias
are inherently flawed (I discuss the interpretation of findings, not the internal validity of research
designs). The claims of this paper are more modest, but nonetheless necessary. The results above
stress that changing the media environment modifies the information available to voters, while also
altering politicians’ behavior. Looking only at the impact of biased outlets on voter information
or on electoral outcomes is insufficient for passing judgement on biased media. Any normative or
empirical evaluation of the consequences of biased media must also take into account politicians’
actions.
1 Related formal literature
The formal literature on biased media is divided into two broad themes: (i) an economic literature
that tries to uncover its origin (reviewed in Gentzkow et al., 2015a) and (ii) a political economy
literature that assesses the impact of media bias (reviewed in Strömberg, 2015). This paper belongs
to this last category.
In many works on the political consequences of biased media, voters seek to pick the best
alternatives among a fixed choice set, a pure adverse selection problem. Biased media outlets then
tend to reduce voters’ welfare since they provide less information (e.g., Bernhardt et al., 2008;
Duggan and Martinelli, 2010; Shapiro, 2016). Scholars, however, have identified several factors
that mitigate the negative impact of biased media. Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) assume that
readers have confirmation bias and thus enjoy some utility from reading biased news. Chen (2007),
Sobbrio (2011), and Warren (2012), in various frameworks, assume that collecting news is costly.
Since biased news providers have more to gain from convincing their readership, they expend
more effort in news collection and may end up providing more information than unbiased outlets.
Competition can also reduce the detrimental effect of media bias as readers then get to learn all
possible non-falsifiable news stories (Anderson and McLaren, 2012; Piolatto and Schuetts, 2015).
A few papers consider the impact of media bias in variants of the Downsian framework. There,
the electorate’s main problem is to control politicians. Overall, whether media outlets inform voters
4
about candidates’ platform (Chan and Suen, 2009; Miura, 2018) or their character (Chakraborty
and Ghosh, 2016), biased media tends to generate polarized platforms as candidates distort their
policy promises to appeal to biased news providers and gain positive coverage. This polarization,
in turn, reduces the electorate’s welfare.
As argued by Fearon (1999) and many after him (e.g., Canes-Wrone et al., 2001; Maskin and
Tirole, 2004; Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita, 2014), the electorate rarely faces a pure control
or a pure selection problem. Voters use politicians’ past actions to infer their future behavior. In
such political agency framework, scholars have long been interested in the effect of transparency
(e.g., Prat, 2005; Fox, 2007; Fox and Van Weelden, 2012). In these important works, voters receive
exogenous signals. Instead, I assume that a representative voter is informed by strategic media
outlets.
As such, my work is in close conversation with Ashworth and Shotts (2010), Gratton (2015),
and Hafer et al. (2016), all of whom study political agency models with a strategic media outlet
(Adachi and Hizen 2014 assume that biased outlets exogenously garble information). The present
manuscript differs from these papers in three important dimensions. First, news providers do
not share the same objective. Ashworth and Shotts consider a truth-motivated news provider,
Gratton and Hafer et al. assume outlets maximize profit, and none studies biased outlets. Second,
my framework is unique in incorporating both presentation and omission biases. Ashworth and
Shotts focus on presentation bias, Gratton on omission bias, Hafer et al. on costly news production.
Finally, I derive novel empirical implications that help interpret findings regarding the electoral
consequences of changes in the media environment.
2 The model
I study a two-period (t ∈ {1, 2}) game with strategic news outlets, politicians, and a (represen-
tative) voter. Each period, the office-holder chooses a policy xt ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, with −1, 0, and 1,
respectively, the left-wing, centrist, and right-wing policy. Without loss of generality, the first-
period incumbent (R) leans right, and his challenger (L) leans left. At the end of period 1, the
voter decides to reelect politician R or elect L after observing: (i) the first-period policy choice
(x1) and (ii) one or two news outlets’ reports, depending on the media environment. The rest of
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the section describes in greater detail the various aspects of the model starting with players’ policy
preferences.
Policy preferences
Policy preferences build on Morelli and Van Weelden (2013). The representative voter’s policy
preference depends on an underlying state of the world ωt ∈ {l, c, r}, t ∈ {1, 2}. It is com-
mon knowledge that the state is drawn i.i.d. each period according to the following distribution:
Pr(ωt = l) = Pr(ωt = r) = π ∈ (0, 1/3], t ∈ {1, 2}. (The assumption of symmetry is meant to
simplify the exposition.) The voter prefers the centrist policy 0 in state ω = c, the left-wing policy
−1 in state l, and the right-wing policy 1 in state r.
Politicians’ preferences are a function of their type and the state of the world. Politician
J ∈ {R,L} is either extremist τ = e or moderate τ = m. It is common knowledge that a politician
is moderate with probability κ ∈ (0, 1): Pr(τ = m) = κ. An extremist politician is non-strategic.
He always implements policy 1 if right-wing and policy −1 if left-wing. A moderate politician
responds to electoral incentives. Further, like the voter, a type-m politician prefers the left-wing
policy in state ω = l and the right-wing policy in state ω = r. Politicians’ and the voter’s policy
preferences diverge in the centrist state: a moderate R prefers the right-wing policy x = 1, a
moderate L prefers the left-wing policy x = −1.
News outlets also have policy preferences. I say that an outlet is unbiased if it shares the
voter’s policy preference. In turn, an outlet exhibits a right-wing bias if it shares the preferences
of a moderate politician R and a left-wing bias if it has similar policy preferences to a moderate
challenger L. All conclusions remain unchanged when biased outlets always prefer extreme policies.
I use the label NU for the unbiased outlet, NR for the right-wing outlet, and NL for the left-wing
outlet.
Table 1 summarizes the ideal policies of all strategic players as a function of the state ω, which
I denote xK(ω), K ∈ {V,R, L,NU , NL, NR}. Observe that all players agree in states l and r.
Thus, these states are assumed to be relatively rare (π ≤ 1/3).
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Players/States l c r
Voter V -1 0 1
Moderate R -1 1 1
Moderate L -1 -1 1
Unbiased outlet NU -1 0 1
Right-wing outlet NR -1 1 1
Left-wing outlet NL -1 -1 1
Table 1: Players’ preferred policies as a function of the state ω (xK(ω))
Payoffs
A moderate politician and news outlets’ per-period payoff simply depends on the distance between
their ideal policy in state ωt ∈ {l, c, r} and the policy implemented xt.
UK(xt) = −|xt − x
K(ωt)|, K ∈ {R,L,N
U , NL, NR}
The voter’s payoff depends on the distance between her ideal policy xV (ω) and the policy choice
as well as a valence shock ξ, which captures the voter’s evaluation of other aspect of politician
R’s performance (e.g., charisma) or various aspects of the political environment in a reduced form
(e.g., partisanship). V observes ξ after x1 is implemented but before making her electoral decision.
I assume that ξ is distributed according to the cumulative distribution function (CDF) F (ξ),







V (ω)|+ ξ if R in office
−|xt − x
V (ω)| otherwise
Players do not discount the future.
Information
The voter never directly learns the state of the world ωt ∈ {l, c, r} or the office holder’s type
τ ∈ {e,m}. She always observes the incumbent R’s first-period policy choice x1 ∈ {−1, 0, 1} and
one or two news reports before making her electoral decision. A politician always observes his type
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and the state of the world before making his policy choice, as do outlets before publicizing their
report.
Outlets’ reports
Outlet N ’s report is denoted nN . I focus exclusively on editorials and news stories. An editorial, or
opinion piece, oN ∈ {m, e} contains falsifiable and non-verifiable (soft) information about politician
R’s type. A news story sN ∈ {∅, dN} possibly contains non-falsifiable and verifiable (hard) informa-
tion about the state of the world. Outlets uncover a news story probabilistically. This is captured
by the variable dN which takes value dN = ω1 with probability ρ ∈ (0, 1) if a news story is uncovered
and dN = ∅ otherwise. The parameter ρ can be interpreted as media quality. To guarantee that
the media environment only changes outlets’ strategic reporting (and to simplify the exposition),






= d ∈ {∅, ω1}.
Media environment
The media environment is said to be ‘unbiased’ if outlet NU makes a report. When both NL
and NR publish a report, I follow Puglisi and Snyder (2015b) and describe the environment as
‘balanced’ (e.g., most U.S. states). The media environment exhibits a ‘right-wing bias’ if the pro-
incumbent outlet NR is the unique news provider (e.g., Italy after Berlusconi’s election in 1994,
see Durante and Knight, 2012) and a ‘left-wing bias’ if only NL makes a report.1
Timing
Period 1:
0. Nature draws the first-period state of the world (ω1 ∈ {l, c, r}) and politicians’ types ((τ
R, τL) ∈
{m, e}2);
1. Politician R observes his type τR, the state of the world ω1 and chooses policy x1 ∈ {−1, 0, 1};
2. News outlet N observes the first-period policy (x1), R’s type (τ
R), and news story (dN ∈
{∅, ω1}). It then publishes a news report n
N ∈ {m, e} × {∅, dN};
3. Voter observes the first-period policy, the outlet’s or outlets’ reports nN , and the valence
shock ξ. She then decides whether to reelect R;




0. Nature draws the second-period state of the world ω2 ∈ {l, c, r};
1. The office-holder (R or L) observes his type, the state of the world, and chooses policy
x2 ∈ {−1, 0, 1};
2. The game ends and payoffs are realized
Equilibrium concept
The equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). A common problem in political
agency models is the multiplicity of equilibria which makes comparison across media environments
difficult. To solve this issue, I impose several refinements that, combined, guarantee uniqueness.
First, I restrict politicians’ strategies (but not outlets’) to pure strategies. Second, editorials
must be directly interpretable when truthful (e.g., contain m if R is moderate) and type-invariant
when uninformative (e.g., contain m for all types τR ∈ {m, e}). Third, the voter believes that R is
moderate if he chooses the centrist policy 0 or the left-wing policy −1 (recall an extremist R always
chooses 1). Fourth, I select the most informative PBE. Finally, I focus on the PBE which maximizes
the voter’s ex-ante expected policy payoff (henceforth, ‘policy welfare’). In Supplemental Appendix
A (pages 3-5), I provide a formal definition of PBE in this framework (see Definition A.1, page 3)
and discuss in greater detail the equilibrium refinements. In what follows, I use the term ‘PBE’
when I characterize strategies that satisfy Definition A.1. The term ‘equilibrium’ refers to PBE
satisfying the five refinements.
Remarks on the set-up
Before proceeding to the analysis, a few remarks on the set-up are in order. I focus on a political
environment which exhibits significant elite polarization, like the United States in recent years
(Bonica et al., 2013). Even moderate politicians do not share the voter’s policy preferences.
This guarantees that the voter faces a double problem of controlling and selecting politicians.
If moderate politicians resemble the voter, hers is a problem of selection, and unbiased outlets
always perform better. In turn, if moderate and extremist politicians have similar preferences
(with moderates responsive to electoral incentives), the selection problem is mute—the voter is
always indifferent between R and L at the time of the election—and the media environment has
no effect.
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My framework incorporates two distinct reporting biases: ‘presentation bias’ (or ‘news distor-
tion’) with editorials and ‘omission bias’ (or ‘news filtering’) with news story. A media outlet
N ’s report suffers from severe presentation bias if its editorial provides no information about the
incumbent’s type (i.e., outlet N babbles). In turn, N ’s report is free of presentation bias if and
only if its editorial always reveals the incumbent’s type. Let a media outlet N ’s editorial strategy
be oN : {m, e} → {m, e} (ignoring x1 for simplicity), a formal definition is:
Definition 1. A media outlet N ’s report suffers from severe presentation bias when for all τR ∈
{m, e}, oN(τR) = z ∈ {m, e}.
A media outlet N ’s report is free from presentation bias if and only if for all τR ∈ {m, e}, oN(τR) =
τR.
In turn, outlet N ’s report suffers from omission bias if and only if N hides a story it uncovered.
Let a media outlet N ’s news story strategy be sN : dN → {∅, dN} (again ignoring x1), a formal
definition is:
Definition 2. A media outlet N ’s report suffers from omission bias whenever sN(ω) = ∅.
A media outlet N ’s report is free from omission bias if and only if sN(ω) = ω.
Finally, let me acknowledge that the equilibrium restrictions play a significant role in estab-
lishing the normative results below. In particular, the focus on the most informative PBE, while
common, is not innocuous. There are several justifications for this choice. This refinement guaran-
tees that any reporting bias is the result of strategic interactions rather than equilibrium selection.
Further, the most informative PBE is the only renegotiation-proof PBE between an unbiased out-
let and the voter. In fact, an unbiased news provider would even be willing to pay a cost (e.g.,
printing a special edition) to credibly signal its report is free of presentation bias.
3 Equilibrium analysis
In this section, I first discuss the second-period office-holder’s behavior and the voter’s electoral
decision. I then describe outlet NU and incumbent R’s equilibrium first-period strategies Finally,
I consider both balanced and biased media environments.
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Voter’s electoral decision
In period 2, absent any electoral pressure, a moderate office-holder always implements his preferred
policy. Using Table 1, a moderate R chooses x2 = 1 in the right-wing and centrist states and
x2 = −1 in state ω2 = l; a moderate L chooses x2 = −1 in the left-wing and centrist states and
x2 = 1 in state ω2 = r. By symmetry, the voter’s expected payoff when a moderate is in office is
−(1− 2π). An extremist R always implements x2 = 1 and an extremist L x2 = −1 so the voter’s
expected policy payoff when the office-holder is extremist is −1.
After observing the first-period policy choice x1 and the outlet’s or outlets’ news report n, V
forms a posterior that R is moderate, which I denote µV (x1, n). The voter’s expected policy payoff
from reelecting R is µV (x1, n)(−(1− 2π)) + (1− µ
V (x1, n))(−1). For the challenger, the voter can
only rely on her prior. Her expected payoff from electing L is then κ(−(1−2π))+(1−κ)(−1). The
voter thus reelects the incumbent R if and only if (after slight rearranging and with indifference a
zero probability event):
µV (x1, n)2π + ξ ≥ κ2π (1)
Since the voter observes ξ after the report(s) or policy choice, outlet(s) and politician R treat ξ as
random. From their perspective, R is reelected with probability
P (reelection|µV ) ≡ 1− F
(





(κ− µV (x1, n))2π
)
∈ [0, 1] for all µV (·) ∈ [0, 1] under the assumptions.
Unbiased media environment
First, consider outlet NU ’s reporting strategy. At the time of its report, the outlet can only
influence the voter’s electoral decision. Since it shares the voter’s preferences, the outlet seeks
to maximize the probability that the second-period office-holder is moderate. NU thus reveals
the incumbent’s type in its editorial. Further, it also discloses any news story it uncovers. Using
Definitions 1 and 2, I obtain:
Lemma 1. In equilibrium, the unbiased news outlet NU ’s report is free of presentation and omis-
sion biases.
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Proof. All proofs for the ‘Equilibrium Analysis’ are collected in the Supplemental Appendix B
(pages 6-29).
Since NU ’s editorial reveals R’s type, R’s first-period action has no effect on his electoral
prospect. Thus, a moderate R always chooses his preferred policy in the first period, xR(·).
Proposition 1. In an unbiased media environment, in equilibrium, in all states ω1 ∈ {l, c, r}, a
moderate R’s first-period policy choice is his preferred policy xR(ω1).
Balanced media environment
In a balanced media environment, the voter receives reports from both the right-wing outlet NR
and the left-wing outlet NL. While the policy preferences of outlets NR and NL are, on average,
the same as the unbiased outlet NU ’s, there is a fundamental difference. The right-wing biased
outlet NR prefers a moderate R to an extreme R, but also an extreme R to any left-wing politician.
The left-leaning outlet NL prefers a random politician L to a moderate R, let alone an extreme
incumbent. No biased outlet shares the voter’s ranking of politicians’ types. As a result, biased
outlets’ reporting differs from an unbiased news provider’s whenever their reports can influence
the voter’s electoral decision.
Lemma 2. Suppose the media environment is balanced. Consider a first-period equilibrium policy
choice that does not reveal politician R’s type. Then,
(i) NL and NR’s reports suffer from severe presentation bias;
(ii) One outlet’s report is free of omission bias.
Any difference in reporting between a balanced and unbiased media environment can be at-
tributed to editorials. When it comes to a news story, the media environment as a whole is always
free of omission bias in all states. The left-wing outlet NL always has an incentive to disclose
information that hurts the incumbent R, and vice versa for the right-wing outlet NR (see Milgrom
and Roberts, 1986).
The same logic does not apply to editorials. To build intuition for this result, suppose that
there exists a PBE in which both news outlets’ reports are free of presentation bias. Both outlets’
editorials should then have the same content, and any difference necessarily implies that one
outlet has lied. The voter, however, does not know which provider did not truthfully report the
12




that outlet NR deviated. To
deter the right-wing outlet from lying, the voter must punish NR by believing that R is almost
certainly an extremist, reducing R’s electoral chances. But this punishment strategy generates an
incentive for the left-wing outlet to engage in presentation bias. (Lemma B.4 in Appendix B, page
8 shows that the logic extends to all possible editorial strategies.) Because elections are a coarse
instrument, in two-candidate elections, one news outlet’s punishment is always the other’s reward,
and the voter cannot encourage truth telling.2
With presentation bias, the incumbent’s first-period policy choice influences the voter’s electoral
decision. A moderate politician R now has some electoral incentive to choose the centrist policy
to signal his type. The strength of these electoral incentives depends on two components. First,












since a moderate R can at most change the voter’s
posterior from 0 to 1 (see Equation 2). Second, the strength of electoral incentives depends on the
expected payoff gain from staying in office rather than being replaced by his challenger L, which
I denote ∆R (∆R = κ× (1− 2π)× 2 + (1− κ)×
(
(1− 2π)× 2 + π × 2
)
).
When deciding whether to implement x1 = 0 in state c or r, a moderate R compares the
associated future gain (electoral benefit and second-period payoff gain) with the associated first-











∆R by the reasoning above) is lower than the cost, electoral
incentives are too weak to induce a change in a moderate type’s first-period behavior. A moderate
R then behaves as if there were no election.
When electoral incentives are relatively strong, two PBE, which I label ‘fully revealing PBE’
and ‘full control PBE,’ are worth studying. In a fully revealing PBE, a moderate R chooses the
centrist policy 0 in both the centrist and right-wing states. (In the left-wing state, a moderate
R always chooses x1 = −1 which maximizes his first-period payoff and reelection chances.) Upon





. If a moderate were to deviate and choose x1 = 1, he would be believed to be
2The voter’s inability to induce truth telling from competing outlets is due to her finite set of options; here,
two candidates (for a theoretical discussion, see Battaglini, 2002). It survives changes in the timing (one outlet
reporting before the other), adding a third candidate (as long as the voter’s second preferred choice is not NL’s least
preferred option), or even introducing more outlets after excluding weakly dominated strategies (any right-leaning
outlet that learns the incumbent is extremist has nothing to lose from lying, and vice versa for a left-leaning outlet).
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In a full control PBE, a moderate R chooses the voter’s preferred policy in all states. In
addition to the condition above, a moderate R also faces an electoral risk by choosing the right-
wing policy in state r. In this instance, the voter believes with high probability that the incumbent





= 1− F (0), which requires the voter learns that the state of the world is right-
wing (x1 = 1 is then not informative since both types implement this policy in state r). Hence, a
moderate right-wing incumbent is willing to choose the right-wing policy only if the electoral cost






∆R < 1. In addition,
even if this condition is satisfied, it must be that the voter is sufficiently likely to learn that the
state of the world is ω1 = r. That is, media quality must be sufficiently high.











∆R < 1, in the unique PBE, a moderate politician R’s first-period











∆R ≥ 1, there exists a PBE in which a moderate politician R’s

















∆R, there exists a threshold
ρ
B
∈ (0, 1) such that if and only if ρ ≥ ρ
B
, there exists a PBE in which a moderate R’s first-period
policy choice is the voter’s preferred policy xV (ω1) in all ω1 ∈ {l, c, r}.
The voter is less informed in a balanced than in an unbiased media environment due to severe
presentation biases. But less information can also induce a moderate incumbent to change his
behavior (as long as electoral incentives are sufficiently strong). A moderate incumbent R may
implement the policy 0 in the centrist state (point 2.) or even the voter’s preferred policy in all
states of the world (point 3.).3
Biased media environments
Editorials again suffer from severe presentation bias. The right-wing outlet always states that the
incumbent is moderate, and the left-wing outlet that the incumbent is extreme. Further, whenever
3The conditions for a full control PBE to exist are not knife-edge. For example, the inequalities are satisfied
strictly for κ = 1/2, π = 1/4, and ξ uniformly distributed over [−π, π].
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it can affect the voter’s evaluation of the incumbent, news reports suffer from some omission bias
in a biased media environment as NR hides bad news for the incumbent and NL good news.
Lemma 3. Suppose the media environment is biased with NJ only reporting, J ∈ {R,L}. Assume
the first-period equilibrium policy choice does not reveal politician R’s type. Then,
(i) NJ ’s report suffers from severe presentation bias;
(ii) There exists ω′1 ∈ {c, r} such that N
J ’s news story suffers from omission bias in state ω′1.
A left-leaning outlet never publishes a news story that improves the voter’s evaluation of the
incumbent. For example, L may never reveal that R’s right-wing policy choice x1 = 1 matches
the state of the world ω1 = r. Upon observing x1 = 1 and no news, the voter then takes into
account that this may be due to the outlet’s omission strategy and her posterior is higher than
absent omission bias. Further, higher media quality ρ implies that no news is more likely to be due
to omission improving the voter’s evaluation of R. The reasoning is reverse for the right-leaning
outlet. NR may never disclose that R’s right-wing policy x1 = 1 does not match the state ω1 = r.
The voter holds a lower opinion of the incumbent after no news in a right-wing biased environment
than in a balanced environment, and her posterior decreases as media quality improves.
Despite the presence of omission bias, similar PBE exist in balanced and biased media envi-
ronments. Low electoral incentives are associated with no control. Strong electoral incentives can
encourage the incumbent to play a fully revealing strategy to maximize his chances of reelection.
In the case of intermediate electoral incentives, the full control PBE also exists for sufficiently high
media quality. Importantly, this media quality threshold depends on the partisanship of the news
provider due to NL and NR’s distinct omission strategies.4











∆R < 1, in the unique PBE, a moderate politician R’s first-period
policy choice is his preferred policy xR(ω1) in all states ω1 ∈ {l, c, r};
2. If
(
F (0) − F
(
− (1 − κ)2π
))
∆R ≥ 1, there exists a PBE in which a moderate politician R’s

















∆R, there exists a threshold
ρ
J
∈ (0, 1) such that if ρ ≥ ρ
J
, there exists a PBE in which a moderate R’s first-period policy
choice is the voter’s preferred policy xV (ω1) in all ω1 ∈ {l, c, r}.
4I only state a sufficient condition for existence of a full control PBE since the voter’s posterior after no news




The previous section establishes that the voter is best informed in an unbiased media environment
(no omission or presentation bias) and least informed in a biased media environment (presentation
and some omission biases), with a balanced media environment in between (only presentation
bias). Absent any change in the incumbent’s behavior, an unbiased media environment always
provides the highest policy welfare to the voter. With an unbiased outlet reporting, the risk of an
electoral mistake is minimized since the voter learns R’s type. However, when electoral incentives










∆R ≥ 1), with biased news providers, there
exist PBE in which a moderate R chooses policies more aligned with voter’s preferences. An
exclusive focus on voter information thus risks exaggerating the negative effect of biased media
outlets.
As the next proposition establishes, the induced change in a moderate incumbent’s actions has
major welfare consequence. In equilibrium (i.e., in the PBE which maximizes the voter policy
welfare), both balanced and biased media environments dominate an unbiased environment. The
gain in terms of control associated with better incumbent’s behavior in the first period dominates
the loss in terms of selection caused by reduced information. This is due to the limited benefit
from selecting a moderate politician as a type m does not share the voter’s policy preference in
the centrist state. In contrast, control guarantees that, in the first period, the voter obtains his
preferred policy at least in the most likely state ω1 = c.











∆R < 1 and is minimized otherwise.
Proof. All proofs for the ‘Normative Implications’ are collected in Supplemental Appendix C
(pages 30-35).
Under the assumption that the valence shock ξ is uniformly distributed (over [−(1−κ)2π, κ2π]
for simplicity), the welfare gain from moving from an unbiased environment to a biased or balanced
one becomes greater (i) when the probability a politician is moderate (κ) increases, as selection
becomes less of an issue, and (ii) when the probability the state is extreme (π) decreases, as control
becomes more valuable.5
5The assumption on ξ guarantees that the direct effect of changing parameter values always dominate the










− (1 − κ)2π
))
∆R ≥ 1 and ξ is uniformly distributed on
the interval [−(1− κ)2π, κ2π]. The difference in voter policy welfare between a balanced or biased
media environment and an unbalanced media environment is strictly increasing with κ and strictly
decreasing with π.
Proposition 4 indicates that biased media do not necessarily harm democracy. It is premature,
however, to conclude that biased outlets do not affect voter welfare. We first need to compare the
voter policy welfare in biased and balance media environments. To do so, the next lemma ranks
fully revealing and full control PBE. Since control dominates selection, quite logically a full control
PBE yields a higher policy welfare than a fully revealing PBE.
Lemma 4. The voter policy welfare is strictly higher in a full control PBE than in a fully revealing
PBE in a balanced or biased media environment.
The next proposition now establishes that the voter policy welfare is always higher in a balanced
media environment than in a biased media environment whenever the valence shock does not change
too fast (e.g., only partisan waves can generate a big swing in R’s reelection chances everything else
equal). Hence, when one viewpoint dominates the media or voters self-select into echo chambers
(Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2015; cf. Flaxman et al., 2016), democratic performance worsens relative
to the appropriate baseline of a balanced media environment.
Proposition 5. There exists F > 0 such that if |F ′′(ξ)| ≤ F , in equilibrium, the voter policy





























∆R and ρ ≥ ρ
B
.
When a moderate incumbent plays a fully revealing strategy in the first period (i.e., x1 = −1
in state l and x1 = 0 otherwise), the media reporting strategy plays no role since the voter
learns the incumbent’s type through his policy choice. In this case, a biased and balanced media
environment produces identical politicians’ actions, identical electoral decision, and, thus, identical
policy welfare.
Suppose now that the equilibrium exhibits full control (x1 = x
V (ω1)) or no control (x1 =
xR(ω1)) in all media environments. The voter is now uncertain about the incumbent’s type after
observing policy x1 = 1. A biased media environment then worsens selection. The left-wing
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outlet always hides good news for the incumbent (e.g., the state is r after x1 = 1) diminishing the
reelection chances of moderate politicians. In turn, the right-wing outlet always hides bad news
for the incumbent (e.g., the state is not r), impeding the screening of extreme politicians.
A biased media environment also affects the voter policy welfare in a subtler way by reducing a
moderate incumbent’s incentive to implement the voter’s preferred policy in all states. A left-wing
outlet reduces the electoral benefit from choosing the right-wing policy in the right-wing state r
since the voter never learns the incumbent is correct. A right-wing outlet increases the incentive of
implementing the right-wing policy when the state is not r as the mistake is not disclosed. Overall,
a biased media environment makes it more difficult to sustain the welfare maximizing full control
PBE.

















∆R). When the media quality is relatively low
(ρ < ρ
B
), the equilibrium is always fully revealing, and the media environment has no impact on




)), the full control PBE exists
only in a balanced media environment, yielding a large difference in policy welfare between biased
and balanced media environments. For high media quality (ρ ≥ ρ
L
), the full control equilibrium













Figure 1: The effect of a balanced media environment on voter policy welfare
The purple plain line is the equilibrium voter policy welfare in a balanced media environment. The red dashed
(blue short dashed) line is the equilibrium voter policy welfare in a right-wing (left-wing) biased media environment.
Parameter values: π = 1/4, κ = 1/2, and ξ is distributed according to a triangular distribution over the interval
[−1/3, 1/3] with mode 0.2.
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The welfare results described in this section are robust to several modification of the framework.
First, they remain substantially unchanged under different information structure (see Supplemental
Appendix E, pages 39-41). They are also likely to hold after incorporating entertainment news
or the cost of producing a news story. Partisan news providers have incentives to offer better
entertainment or to expend more effort uncovering news stories (e.g., Warren, 2012) since they
have more to gain from convincing the voter to elect their favourite candidate.
I also conjecture the findings would survive in a game lasting more than two periods (assuming
stationary equilibrium). An unbiased media outlet would still reveal the incumbent’s type in his
first term in office generating a loss of control in all periods. A biased media outlet’s editorial would
still suffer from severe presentation bias leaving the possibility for better control in a politician’s
first term and possibly beyond,resulting in higher policy welfare.
Behavioral extremists simplifies the analysis, but is not key for my normative conclusions. With
a strategic extremist, the voter could gain control over both types rather than just moderates with
biased outlets reporting. This would come at a cost in term of selection (especially when extremists
have higher gain from staying in office), but the overall effect would often be positive as control
dominates selection (see Appendix F, pages 42-44).
In contrast, my welfare results are likely to be reversed when the electorate harbours heteroge-
neous policy preferences, thus exacerbating the importance of selection. Similarly, one important
class of models in which the normative conclusion would not hold are models of political posturing,
in which politicians take extreme rather than moderate actions to signal their type (e.g., Fox and
Stephenson, 2011; Kartik and Van Weelden, 2017). Even then, this paper stresses that scholars
should examine the whole strategic interactions between the electorate, politicians, and outlets
before passing judgement on the danger or benefit of certain media environments.
5 Empirical implications
I now turn to the empirical implications of my framework. For ease of exposition, I focus exclusively
on the most interesting case: when electoral incentives are intermediary (i.e.,
(















∆R) so the equilibrium with biased outlets reporting
is either fully revealing or exhibits full control (Propositions 2 and 3). Second, I assume that the
sufficient condition described in Proposition 5 holds (|F ′′(ξ)| ≤ F ), and the CDF of the valence
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shock is either strictly concave or strictly convex over the interval [0, 2κπ]. (Appendix G, pages
45-47 describes the empirical implications when these assumptions are relaxed.)
From the onset, let me stress some limits to the exercise. Most prominently, a biased media
environment is a theoretical construct; in practice, the electorate is always exposed to multiple
sources and adjusts its media consumption as a function of the environment (Durante and Knight,
2012). The scenarios discussed below, thus, represent ideal cases (where all voters are treated),
but they are still informative as long as exposure to biased news providers changes with the media
environment (i.e., some voters are compliers). In addition, researchers consider vote shares as
their main measure of electoral outcomes (e.g., DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007; Gerber et al., 2009;
Enikopolov et al., 2011; Gentzkow et al., 2011; DellaVigna et al., 2014; Adena et al., 2015; Barone
et al., 2015; Peisakhin and Rozenas, 2017; Martin and Yurukoglu, 2017). In turn, I can only
look at the ex-ante reelection probability as vote share is always zero or one with a representative
voter. This is without much loss, however, as one can construct vote shares assuming a large
electorate of identical voters and an i.i.d. valence shock. Finally, my set-up always includes an
incumbent, whereas empirical papers also look at open races (e.g., the 2000 U.S. presidential
election in DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007). This is less of an issue if the (non-running) incumbent’s
past performance reveals information about his replacement’s political leaning (e.g., President Bill
Clinton’s performance is informative of Vice-President Al Gore’s ideology).
Even though the voter is sophisticated and well aware of outlets’ biases and strategy, whenever
the equilibrium exhibits full control, the media environment changes R’s electoral fortune. Define
PB(ρ), PL(ρ), and PR(ρ) the ex-ante probability that a politician R is reelected as a function of
media quality ρ in a balanced, left-wing biased, and right-wing biased environment, respectively.
I obtain:
Proposition 6. The incumbent’s ex-ante reelection probabilities satisfy:
(i) PB(ρ) = PJ(ρ) for J ∈ {R,L} if and only if ρ < ρB;
(ii) PR(ρ) = PL(ρ) only if ρ < min{ρR, ρL}.
Proof. All proofs for the ‘Positive Implications’ are collected in the Supplemental Appendix D
(pages 36-38).
The media environment affects R’s reelection chances through two distinct channels. First, the
incumbent modifies his equilibrium behavior (Propositions 2 and 3). As the next corollary shows,
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R’s reelection chances are different in a fully revealing PBE than in a full control PBE (i.e., R’s
reelection probability jumps at the media quality thresholds ρ
J
, J ∈ {B,L,R}).
Corollary 2. The incumbent ex-ante reelection probability PJ(ρ), J ∈ {B,L,R}, is almost every-
where continuous in ρ. It exhibits a discontinuity at ρ = ρ
J
.
R’s reelection probabilities can also vary within a full control equilibrium across media environ-
ments. Recall that in a balanced media environment, there is no omission bias. One outlet’s report
always contains the uncovered news story. This does not hold true in a biased media environment.
NR hides bad news for the incumbent, lowering the voter’s evaluation of R after no news. NL
hides good news, increasing the voter’s opinion after no news. Both lead to different reelection
chances than in the scenario absent omission bias. The different reporting strategies of NL and
NR also explain why the incumbent’s ex-ante reelection prospects are different in left-wing and
right-wing biased media environments.
Turning to the empirical literature, a majority of studies uses exogenous variation in outlets
availability to measure the electoral consequence of changing the media environment (e.g., se-
quential entry in DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2017). This empirical strategy often holds politicians’
behavior constant (e.g., because outlets are available in a small geographical area). As such, these
clever designs recover the effect of changing voter information. But these empirical studies also fail
to capture how politicians’ behaviour may change with the media environment. Therefore, they
may be of limited use to design policy responses to media mergers.
Further, empirical estimates obtained from studies exploiting exogenous variation in exposure
are not easily comparable with results from works that focus on fully anticipated changes to the
media environment (e.g., newspapers’ entry and exit in Gentzkow et al., 2011). The latter does not
just measure the effect of changing voter information, but its results also encompass office-holders’
possible strategic responses. Hence, researchers should not expect these two strategies to yield
similar findings (e.g., compare the results in DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007 and Gentzkow et al.,
2011).
Finally, this paper suggests that researchers should be careful when interpreting varying esti-
mates between studies or even over time within a single study. The lack of consistency in empirical
results is often attributed to changes in outlets’ persuasiveness (e.g., DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007
and Martin and Yurukoglu, 2017). My paper highlights two competing rationales. First, estimates
can be affected by changes in office-holders’ behaviour. As the new outlet’s coverage increases,
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politicians adjust their behaviour accordingly. Second, estimates are likely to be sensitive to the
political environment. Fixing the identity of reporting outlets, an office-holder’s electoral chances
vary with his own ideological leaning.
The model can also be used to evaluate whether empirical works measure the impact of biased
media. In practice, researchers cannot directly compare electoral outcomes under unbiased and
biased media environments. Rather, they use a balanced media environment as a baseline to make
inferences about the consequences of media bias. This problem, well-understood when it comes to
measuring the extent of media slant (Groeling, 2013), has generally been ignored when it comes to
assessing the effect of biased media. The next proposition shows that it should not be. Empirical
studies using a balanced media environment as the baseline are unlikely to yield proper estimate
of the impact of biased media. Denote PU the ex-ante probability that a politician R is reelected
when the voter’s news provider is unbiased. Then, I obtain:
Proposition 7. PU = PB(ρ) if and only if ρ < ρB
The two environments yield similar reelection probabilities only if the incumbent R plays a fully
revealing strategy with biased media outlets reporting. Whenever the equilibrium exhibits full
control, selection becomes imperfect in a balanced media environment and the two environments
are no longer observationally equivalent.
When media quality is high, current empirical research may not measure the impact of media
bias, but is it still informative? The answer turns out to be negative in my set-up. Depending
on parameter values, using a balanced media environment as baseline leads to upwardly biased,
downwardly biased or even wrongly signed estimates of the electoral impact of media bias.
Figure 2 highlights this issue. The red plain line represents the difference in politician R’s
ex-ante winning probabilities in a right-wing biased compared to a balanced media environment:
PR(ρ) − PB(ρ). The gray dashed line is the difference in reelection probabilities in a right-wing
biased media environment compared to an unbiased media environment: PR(ρ)− PU . For media
quality lower than the threshold ρ
R
(above which a full control PBE exists), the researcher would
find a negative effect of biased media with a balanced environment as the baseline. However,
media bias has no effect in practice since the incumbent plays a fully revealing strategy in both
a right-wing biased and an unbiased media environment. In turn, for media quality between
ρ
R
and some ρ′, empirical studies would find a smaller positive effect of biased media than it is
actually the case (the red plain line is below the gray dashed line). The reverse holds true for
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Figure 2: Media environment and reelection probability
The red plain line is PR(ρ)−PB(ρ). The gray dashed line is PR(ρ)−PU . Parameter values: π = 1/4, κ = 0.5, and
F (ξ) = F̂ (ξ)/F̂ (π) with F̂ (ξ) = 3
2
π(ξ + κ2π)− 1
2
(ξ + κ2π)2 if ξ ∈ [−κ2π,−( 1
4









− κ)2π)2 if ξ ∈ [−( 1
4
− κ)2π, κ2π].
ρ ∈ [ρ′, ρ+]. Worse, empirical research may find that a biased outlet improves the incumbent’s
electoral chances compared with a balanced environment as baseline when it actually decreases
the incumbent’s reelection probability compared to coverage by an unbiased news provider (for
ρ ≥ ρ+).
Let me stress that a balanced media environment is a poor approximation of an unbiased
environment only if outlets can engage in presentation bias. In settings where information is
likely to be verifiable, researchers may, thus, recover the impact of biased media. Further, current
estimates still measure important quantities. Existing empirical findings are especially relevant
when there is no possibility (or no desire) to guarantee that news providers are unbiased. Yet,
even so, estimates vary as a function of the political and media environments under scrutiny.
Hence, a richer description of these factors can then lead to better comparability across studies
and more informed policy-making.
6 Conclusion
Writing in the New York Times in 2015, Timothy Carney asserts that “[n]ews media bias is real.
It reduces the quality of journalism, and it fosters distrust among readers and viewers. This is
bad for democracy.” This paper shows that Carney is only partially correct. Media bias does
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reduce the quality of journalism and fosters distrust due to presentation bias. However, it is not
necessarily bad for democracy. Due to office-holders’ strategic responses, a biased or balanced
media environment can yield higher voter welfare than an unbiased environment.
The strategic interplay between news providers, politicians, and voters also has important
implications for empirical research. The electoral consequences of changing the media environment
depends on the political situation, especially incumbents’ partisan identities. Thus, researchers
should use caution when interpreting varying estimates across studies or over time within a single
study. Further, different news providers may induce different policy choices. Looking only at
voter information or electoral outcomes may not be sufficient to understand the impact of biased
media. A more comprehensive approach that also considers office-holders’ actions—along the
lines of Snyder and Strömberg (2010) for media penetration—seems necessary. Even then, due
to presentation biases, a balanced media environment is a poor approximation for an unbiased
environment making it difficult to empirically evaluate the impact of media bias.
At a deeper level, the present work joins a few papers proposing a new link between theory
and empirics. Rather than focusing on comparative statics (Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita,
2006), these studies (re)assess in various contexts what empirical estimates actually measure (e.g.,
Eggers, 2017 for the incumbency effect; Wolton, 2017 for special interest group influence). This
approach, broadly defined, uses formal reasoning to rethink empirical counterfactuals.6 It is best
described as ‘Theoretical Implications of Empirical Models’ (TIEM). Given that counterfactuals
are at the core of any empirical work claiming causality (Fearon, 1991), the applications of TIEM
logic are potentially numerous. A full analysis of the benefits and pitfalls of this approach could
generate new fruitful complementarities between empirical and formal works.
6This approach is related to, but not equivalent to the analysis of historical events with game theoretical models
that rely on off-path behavior (see Weingast, 1996). The counterfactual analysis I briefly describe is grounded in
on-path behavior to make sense of observables.
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